A Neo-Pragmatist Account of Normativity
This article develops a two-step neo-pragmatist account of normativity that explains (1) what we are doing when we use normative concepts and (2) how such practices emerged. I suggest that we use normative concepts (like “should”) to express and endorse inferences in practical reasoning – reasoning...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicat: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2026
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | This article develops a two-step neo-pragmatist account of normativity that explains (1) what we are doing when we use normative concepts and (2) how such practices emerged. I suggest that we use normative concepts (like “should”) to express and endorse inferences in practical reasoning – reasoning that tells us what to do. These inferences are not logical entailments between propositions, but rather material inferences that commit us to certain actions. The second step is to give a natural, evolutionary story of how such a practice could emerge. I argue that a crucial development occurs when agents begin to recognize exceptions to earlier commitments. This change allows entitlement relations to emerge in addition to commitments. The emergence of both entitlements and commitments enables these social practices to develop in such a way that a structure of material inferences takes shape, thereby making the practice normative. |
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