Kitcher, Pragmatic Pluralism, and The Correspondence Truth
This essay scrutinizes Kitcher’s pragmatic pragmatism and the prospects for its reconciliation with the correspondence truth. After describing Kitcher’s view, it puts forward three considerations. The first section argues that there is a severe tension in Kitcher’s reconciling stance, which is relat...
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| 出版年: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| 言語: | Anglais |
| 出版事項: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| 要約: | This essay scrutinizes Kitcher’s pragmatic pragmatism and the prospects for its reconciliation with the correspondence truth. After describing Kitcher’s view, it puts forward three considerations. The first section argues that there is a severe tension in Kitcher’s reconciling stance, which is related to his twofold conception of “world.” Tracing back the root of the problem to two ideas underlying his work (i.e., the map metaphor and the objectivistic-atomistic account of reference), the second section discusses two alternative ideas that seem to be more consistent with pragmatic pluralism, namely, the tool metaphor and the intersubjective-holistic account of reference. Based on these considerations, the final section reflects on the prospects of two options for the reconciliation project: either, in line with Rortyian pragmatism, to abandon representationalism and to squeeze such semantic concepts as “truth” as much as possible or, in agreement with truth pluralism, to present a pluralistic account at the level of such semantic notions as truth, which, it is claimed, seems to be a more promising and less revisionary strategy for Kitcher. |
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