The Right to Irony
Some years ago, Robert Brandom transformed the question “Who are we?” that had guided MIE into an exploration of the problem of what form of good life political institutions ought to promote. So, the new political question is: What is the best form of life to develop, given the kind of we that we ar...
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| Publicado en: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Autor Principal: | |
| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicado: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | Some years ago, Robert Brandom transformed the question “Who are we?” that had guided MIE into an exploration of the problem of what form of good life political institutions ought to promote. So, the new political question is: What is the best form of life to develop, given the kind of we that we are? In this article, I follow the thread of that aspect of Brandom’s work to highlight affinities and divergences with Rorty’s ironist-liberal project. This will result, on the one hand, in identifying certain blind spots in Brandom’s approach to the phenomenon of language and, on the other, in defending what I will call the “right to irony,” which will be presented as a condition for exercising the “right to be known” recently developed by Jennifer Lackey. |
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