Social Trust versus Liberal Irony
This paper explores Robert Brandom’s contribution to the issues of emancipation and autonomy in modernity by focusing on the transition he advocates from “irony to trust.” To fully appreciate Brandom’s notion of trust, it must be contrasted with Rorty’s notion of irony. I argue that Brandom’s thick...
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| Publicado en: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Autor Principal: | |
| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicado: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | This paper explores Robert Brandom’s contribution to the issues of emancipation and autonomy in modernity by focusing on the transition he advocates from “irony to trust.” To fully appreciate Brandom’s notion of trust, it must be contrasted with Rorty’s notion of irony. I argue that Brandom’s thick notion of social normativity articulated by recognition yields a richer, more robust model of autonomy than Rorty does. Grounding the discussion in the Enlightenment and tracing the Rousseau-Kant lineage, the analysis develops Brandom’s turn to trust as a way to overcome alienation characterizing modern self-governance. The main point is that normative statuses are not created by acts of self-legislation. Instead, normative statuses are socially instituted and binding only when complemented by reciprocal recognition across distinct social roles. From this, I distinguish between Rorty’s focus on ironic self-legislation and the private/public distinction and Brandom’s call for a transformation of agency to overcome alienation. The analysis concludes by discussing how Brandom’s model fosters a new form of intentional agency, bridging the private/public gap without collapsing plural vocabularies into a monolithic public normative order. |
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