Justification, Pluralism and Pragmatism

This article explores the problems and possibilities of offering a compelling Peircian epistemic justification of liberal institutions, primarily via critical engagement with the work of Cheryl Misak, and uses this to make some wider points about the criteria for a successful justification of libera...

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Xuất bản năm:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap,
Tác giả chính: Sleat, Matt
Định dạng: Article ou chapitre numérique
Ngôn ngữ:Anglais
Được phát hành: European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2017
Truy cập trực tuyến:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Miêu tả
Tóm tắt:This article explores the problems and possibilities of offering a compelling Peircian epistemic justification of liberal institutions, primarily via critical engagement with the work of Cheryl Misak, and uses this to make some wider points about the criteria for a successful justification of liberalism in conditions of pluralism. Though the article argues that Misak’s argument fails to take seriously enough the problem that pluralism poses for the justification of liberal politics in modern democratic societies, and that in this sense a version of political liberalism is superior, it nevertheless ends by tentatively suggesting an alternative account of a Peircian epistemological justification that has some potentially promising and attractive features.