Who Gets to Play?
Brandom’s inferentialism relies on a highly idealized account of discursive practices of giving and asking for reasons, which deviates considerably from concrete, real-life practices. In particular, it abstracts away features pertaining to politics and to the power relations among those involved in...
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| Vydáno v: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Jazyk: | Anglais |
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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Shrnutí: | Brandom’s inferentialism relies on a highly idealized account of discursive practices of giving and asking for reasons, which deviates considerably from concrete, real-life practices. In particular, it abstracts away features pertaining to politics and to the power relations among those involved in these practices. In this paper, I contrast Brandom’s account of the “game of giving and asking for reasons” with the conceptualization of argumentation as epistemic exchange (of reasons) that I have been developing in recent years. My account openly aims to be more realistic, taking into consideration in particular the cognitive limitations of human beings and the power relations underpinning discursive interactions. To illustrate the differences between the two approaches, I discuss a specific case study, namely the societal debates on the folk figure of “Black Pete” in the Netherlands. The case study illustrates in particular the limitations of Brandom’s account when it comes to problematizing the potentially exclusionary, status quo-affirming aspects of discursive practices of giving and asking for reasons. |
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