Norms and Novelty in the Space of Reasons
Robert B. Brandom builds a vast philosophical system that begins from and depends on the claim that we are concept- or vocabulary-mongering creatures. Philosophy, he claims, is the discipline concerned with reflection on who we are, where who we are is defined discursively, and thus is concerned wit...
Enregistré dans:
| Dans: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Langue: | Anglais |
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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| Accès en ligne: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | Robert B. Brandom builds a vast philosophical system that begins from and depends on the claim that we are concept- or vocabulary-mongering creatures. Philosophy, he claims, is the discipline concerned with reflection on who we are, where who we are is defined discursively, and thus is concerned with reasoning about reasoning. In this article, I interrogate how Brandom’s understanding of “we” ought to be understood in light of the historical exclusion of women from the sorts of rational practices and abilities that are thought to be integral to it. My argument thus corroborates and builds upon recent work suggesting that the problems of epistemic injustice are relevant to, but largely ignored in, Brandom’s project. In short, I contend that Brandom’s theory of discursive normativity, where norms and novelty depend on a particular understanding of the space of reasons, does not provide the necessary theoretical tools to understand the historical exclusion of women from that space, or to explain how they have gained or might gain access to it. |
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