The Relationship between Mind and Nature
In contemporary philosophy, scientific advancements have deepened our exploration of the relationship between mind and nature, as well as between mind and living organisms. Scientific physicalism, the dominant view, holds that everything is physical and that all phenomena can be fully understood thr...
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Cyhoeddwyd yn: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Prif Awduron: | , |
| Fformat: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Iaith: | Anglais |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Crynodeb: | In contemporary philosophy, scientific advancements have deepened our exploration of the relationship between mind and nature, as well as between mind and living organisms. Scientific physicalism, the dominant view, holds that everything is physical and that all phenomena can be fully understood through natural science. However, this paper will present a different view, based on the position in common sense physicalism holding that the world is constituted at a fundamental level by human beings and their associated macro-physical phenomena. As such, scientific physicalists rely solely on scientific explanations, particularly those offered by medical materialism or neuroscience, which need to be revised in order to fully grasp human experiences and understand the world. This stance on common sense physicalism resonates with pragmatist philosophers like William James, revealing the limitations of neuroscience when explaining religious experience. The present paper suggests that a fuller understanding of such phenomena may be achieved by examining religious experience through everyday experience and perception. In this way, philosophy might broaden its scope beyond scientific explanations by giving more attention to the subjectivity inherent in religious experience and the concrete realities of daily life. Such an approach could complement the more reductive framework of neuroscience. |
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