Peirce and James on Belief and Its Meaning
Peirce proposes that people perceive belief through feeling and action, should follow the “method of science” to fix belief, and can use the principle of pragmatism to regulate the meaning of belief. James’s pragmatism further extends the norm of the meaning of belief, emphasising that when faced wi...
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| Dans: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Langue: | Anglais |
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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2025
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| Accès en ligne: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | Peirce proposes that people perceive belief through feeling and action, should follow the “method of science” to fix belief, and can use the principle of pragmatism to regulate the meaning of belief. James’s pragmatism further extends the norm of the meaning of belief, emphasising that when faced with genuine options, an individual has the right to use subjective will to fix belief. So Peirce and James disagree about whether intellect or will should be used to fix belief. I propose that intellect and will cooperate in different proportions to fix belief in the cognitive and non-cognitive realms. Peirce’s and James’s differing definitions of reality influence their respective understandings of true belief. I argue that people’s cognition of reality is an experience formed with the assistance of both the individual and the community, and that when an experience fully and thoroughly reveals and verifies the corresponding reality, it is true belief. |
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