Pragmatism and Post-Truth
This paper begins by contrasting two familiar approaches to truth and justification: realist and anti-realist, in order to indicate, firstly, two important, but diametrically opposed, intuitions they each capture about these notions, and secondly, the epistemological problems they each give rise to:...
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| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Anglais |
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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2024
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | This paper begins by contrasting two familiar approaches to truth and justification: realist and anti-realist, in order to indicate, firstly, two important, but diametrically opposed, intuitions they each capture about these notions, and secondly, the epistemological problems they each give rise to: radical scepticism and relativism respectively. It then introduces a third, fallibilist-pragmatist account, which captures each of the important insights of the other two accounts while avoiding their problems. The paper concludes by showcasing how the fallibilist-pragmatist approach differs from both relativism and radical scepticism, and in doing so fares better than they do in navigating the issue of academic freedom and “cancel culture” on college campuses. |
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