A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism

A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism

The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s...

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1. autor: Giladi, Paul
Format: Article ou chapitre numérique
Język:Anglais
Wydane: European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2017
Dostęp online:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_415 https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.415 urn:doi:10.4000/ejpap.415 en https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/415 2017-01-12T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fn2u https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Associazione Pragma info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap Giladi, Paul The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
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description The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation.
author Giladi, Paul
spellingShingle Giladi, Paul
A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
author_facet Giladi, Paul
author_sort Giladi, Paul
title A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
title_short A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
title_full A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
title_fullStr A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
title_full_unstemmed A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
title_sort critique of rorty’s conception of pragmatism
publisher European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
publishDate 2017
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.415
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/415
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