A Critique of Rorty’s Conception of Pragmatism
The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s...
Salvato in:
| Pubblicato in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
|---|---|
| Autore principale: | |
| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Anglais |
| Pubblicazione: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2017
|
| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |