Fine and the Pragmatist Tradition
This paper examines the relationship between Arthur Fine’s “Natural Ontological Attitude” and the work of neo-pragmatists, particularly Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. I argue that many of the problems that face Fine’s account can be seen as a direct result of his failure to employ certain key prag...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রকাশিত: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
|---|---|
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| ভাষা: | Anglais |
| প্রকাশিত: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2024
|
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | This paper examines the relationship between Arthur Fine’s “Natural Ontological Attitude” and the work of neo-pragmatists, particularly Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. I argue that many of the problems that face Fine’s account can be seen as a direct result of his failure to employ certain key pragmatist insights concerning the nature and status of the realism-antirealism issue. Consequently, I suggest that we should cease to think of Fine as representative of mainstream attempts to dispense with the realism-antirealism issue and instead view NOA as an unfortunate mixture of opposed philosophical traditions. |
|---|