The Existential Deficit in Ethics
Much of the ethical theory posit the moral value in the action and believe in the rational systematization of morality. However, these theories are not able to deal with one of the most interesting and relevant questions in our moral lives, namely, moral dilemmas. They argue that moral dilemmas are...
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| Pubblicato in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Autore principale: | |
| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Anglais |
| Pubblicazione: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2021
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| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Riassunto: | Much of the ethical theory posit the moral value in the action and believe in the rational systematization of morality. However, these theories are not able to deal with one of the most interesting and relevant questions in our moral lives, namely, moral dilemmas. They argue that moral dilemmas are not possible since they cannot be integrated into an ethical system without accepting inconsistence. On the contrary, moral theories that deny the possibility of systematization recognize the importance of moral dilemmas for ethics and our lives. This relationship between ethics and our moral lives replaces the centrality of the action with the self. One of the philosophers that made this connection between the self and morality was John Dewey. This paper argues that rational moral theories suffer from an existential deficit and that Dewey’s approach acknowledges how humans change themselves through their moral action, and that moral choices are, in some sense, existential choices. |
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