A Permissivist Ethics of Belief
We generally consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Yet there are many beliefs which are deprived of adequate epistemic evidence. In such cases, James recommends the “subjective method” which allows us to hold beliefs for practical reasons. This pragmatist move is...
Enregistré dans:
| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Hovedforfatter: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Anglais |
| Udgivet: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2018
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |