Disraeli and the Eastern Question 1875‒78: Finance, Defence and Politics
This essay considers an aspect of the great ‘Eastern’ (Ottoman and Balkan) crisis of 1875‒78, which has never been properly treated before: the policies of Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield), that secured a great British triumph, at once peaceful and painless. His actions were original and unusual—as o...
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| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/cve, |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Anglais |
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Cahiers victoriens et édouardiens
2025
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | This essay considers an aspect of the great ‘Eastern’ (Ottoman and Balkan) crisis of 1875‒78, which has never been properly treated before: the policies of Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield), that secured a great British triumph, at once peaceful and painless. His actions were original and unusual—as one might expect—but they also drew on long established ideas about British strength in international relations. What was original was the emphasis he placed on the show of strength: politically, by manipulating parliamentary and public proceedings as symbolic gestures, and by troop and naval movements, actual or projected. This was the so-called policy of ‘determination’ or ‘demonstrations’. The conventional aim of this apparently aggressive policy was to avoid Crimean ‘drift’ and so uphold peace. It was supported by presenting Britain as politically united (thereby marginalising Gladstone’s opposition), and by conceiving of British military resources in thoroughly traditional fashion: as a small, mobile force that could be transported by sea to a wide range of possible destinations. Above all, Disraeli traded on Britain’s financial strength as compared to Russia’s weakness, and hence inability to fight a major European war—ideas that were orthodox in both Britain and Russia as well as the international money markets. These instruments of strength and manipulation produced the collapse of Russia’s position, as between the peace terms she imposed on the Turks at San Stefano and the European settlement at the Congress of Berlin. |
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