Non-humans and Collective Rights, An Opportunity to Clarify the Concept of Interest

Future generations, animals, rivers, species, ecosystems, artworks, androids. The list of non-human and collective entities aspiring to legal personification is growing. An increasing number of states are granting them rights in order to protect them as being of their own. Article 71 of the Constitu...

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محفوظ في:
التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Valmalette, Clarisse
التنسيق: Article ou chapitre numérique
اللغة:Français
منشور في: 2024
الموضوعات:
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
الوصف
الملخص:Future generations, animals, rivers, species, ecosystems, artworks, androids. The list of non-human and collective entities aspiring to legal personification is growing. An increasing number of states are granting them rights in order to protect them as being of their own. Article 71 of the Constitution of Ecuador is one of the most striking examples, as it makes Nature (Pacha Mama) a subject of rights, including the right to respect its existence and the right to the regeneration of its vital cycles. The vulnerability of these non-human and collective entities requires protection beyond individual interests. Often lacking legal personality, these entities cannot take legal action on their own. Their interests, although increasingly protected by legal norms, remain partially defended by the legal system. This is explained by the theoretical and practical difficulties of opening the access to the courtroom to claimants acting on behalf of a third party, in this case, the non-human or collective entities. It is the legal obstacles that we are trying to overcome here. The French principle “Nul ne plaide par procureur” forbids any person to claim a subjective right that is not his own, without requiring a power of attorney from the beneficiary of the right. In most legal system, the term “interest” is used to describe the most important standing requirement. It usually relates to the injured interest of the claimant. Legal actions on behalf of a third party are only admitted by exception, and too often, without the necessary conceptual tools to address them. Both legal action and the legal protection of interests have been approached only through the prism of human and/or individual needs and interests. The recognition of non-human and collective rights reshuffles the deck of procedural law. It is necessary to review the interest as locus standi (l’intérêt à agir) as potentially characterized by the claimant’s motivation which can be something else than the violation of his own right. The category of beneficiaries of rights must be extended to include entities, whatever they may be, whose interests are objectively protected by legal norms. Legal action must be conceived as being subordinated not to a personal interest of the claimant, but to a competence norm whose content is left to the decision of the normative authorities. Procedural remedies can accommodate a wide variety of configurations. It is up to democratic bodies to balance the need to safeguard rights without encouraging the congestion of the courts. However, under the influence of the “cause lawyering”, litigations concerning the rights of non-humans and collectivities are reshaping the role of justice in our legal systems. Beyond the resolution of individual conflicts, it must now rule on issues that are usually discussed within democratic arenas.