Aristotle, Friendship and Virtue
Aristotle’s ethics has been the wellspring for much contemporary discussion of ideal friendship and what might be importantly and distinctively valuable about it. In this paper I describe one Aristotelian view about relations between friendship and virtue, and I develop an account of this view to s...
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
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| Μορφή: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Γλώσσα: | Français |
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2014
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Περίληψη: | Aristotle’s ethics has been the wellspring for much contemporary discussion of ideal friendship and what might be importantly and distinctively valuable about it. In this paper I describe one Aristotelian view about relations between friendship and virtue, and I develop an account of this view to shed light on how the shared activity of ideal friendship can be plausibly understood to generate and maintain virtue and a valuable life. I describe and develop this view in contrast to another Aristotelian view, most common in recent discussions, where the shared activity of ideal friendship is claimed to be the province of those already near perfect and fully formed in virtue, and about how such virtuous exemplars might regard one another and contribute to one another’s leading of a valuable life and on-going virtue. |
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