Luhmann's Ontology
Although Luhmann rejects ontology as a pre-modern artifact of “Old Europe,” his constructivist epistemology must presuppose a “reality that remains unknown.” Such an unknown and unknowable reality can neither be represented nor serve as the immediate cause of knowledge production, even if it remains...
Enregistré dans:
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| 格式: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| 語言: | Français |
| 出版: |
2012
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| 在線閱讀: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| 總結: | Although Luhmann rejects ontology as a pre-modern artifact of “Old Europe,” his constructivist epistemology must presuppose a “reality that remains unknown.” Such an unknown and unknowable reality can neither be represented nor serve as the immediate cause of knowledge production, even if it remains as a posited condition of possibility. This paper investigates Luhmann’s reliance on second order cybernetics, especially Gotthard Günther’s reading of Hegel, in his abbreviated critique of ontology and in his advocacy of constructivist epistemology, while also comparing his results with Bernard d’Espagnat’s philosophical interpretation of quantum physics. To understand the consistency of Luhmann’s “ontological commitment” (despite his denials), it is crucial to distinguish between a mind-independent reality (that remains unknowable) and the empirical reality of observations (not entities), as explicated by d’Espagnat. |
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