Holier than me? Threatening Social Comparison in the Moral Domain
This short review analyzes the specificity of upward social comparison in the moral domain, suggesting that it blends Festinger’s (1954) distinction between opinions and abilities. We discuss positive outcomes (elevation) and negative ones (resentment), and moderators of this reaction. Then we ident...
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicat: |
2007
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | This short review analyzes the specificity of upward social comparison in the moral domain, suggesting that it blends Festinger’s (1954) distinction between opinions and abilities. We discuss positive outcomes (elevation) and negative ones (resentment), and moderators of this reaction. Then we identify the ways in which moral comparison constitutes a uniquely stinging threat (moral inferiority, moral confusion, and imagined moral reproach). Finally, we explore some of the strategies that people might use to defuse this moral threat (suspicion, trivialization and rejection). |
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