No mass-elite gap on EU matters in Britain in June 2016?
The Brexit referendum allegedly showcased an opinion divide on European integration between British citizens and political elites. Yet, no dedicated study of “EU issue congruence” has been realised in its wake, whereas earlier comparative analyses had found little opinion discrepancy in the UK. This...
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
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2025
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | The Brexit referendum allegedly showcased an opinion divide on European integration between British citizens and political elites. Yet, no dedicated study of “EU issue congruence” has been realised in its wake, whereas earlier comparative analyses had found little opinion discrepancy in the UK. This article fills the gap. Leveraging mass and elite survey data uniquely gathered in mid-2016 in ten countries, it comprehensively assesses congruence at the time of the referendum. Remarkably, the UK of 2016 shows almost no trace of the “pro-EU elite bias” which constitutes the prevailing transnational trend. At country level, tight mass-elite correspondence emerges. At party level, the British parties even display overall anti-EU elite bias. The findings complement the “Brexitology” literature originated from the referendum. In comparative perspective, they prove that “constraining dissensus” can come in many guises, not necessarily as a mass-elite gap on the dimension of European integration. Accordingly, comparative research on EU issue congruence might neglect certain kinds of opinion gaps. Other blind spots of this body of research, at the party level, concern unclear linkages between party-voter congruence and parties’ prospects, and treatment of parties as “black boxes”. |
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