Des échanges internationaux à la globalisation de la production et la concurrence des systèmes
Globalisation is not only characterized by an increasing number of international mergers and acquisitions, but also by a proliferation of national systems of competition law and of control of industrial concentration. The multitude of national systems of control, however similar in their princip...
Guardat en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicat: |
2002
|
| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | Globalisation is not only characterized by an increasing number of international mergers
and acquisitions, but also by a proliferation of national systems of competition law and
of control of industrial concentration. The multitude of national systems of control,
however similar in their principles, results in a diversity of laws both as regards substance
and enforcement. Therefore, rather than compensating for the absence of international
rules of competition law, the many national laws increase transaction costs, are haunted
by inherent limitations, and risk to produce international conflicts. The report, first,
explains the jurisdictional limitations of national control over international mergers, the
difficulties to properly determine the relevant international markets, and the risk of a
national bias in assessing cross-border mergers. It then goes on to present both the high
transaction costs resulting from the necessity to comply with a large number of
procedurally different systems of control, and the obstacles which divergences of
substantive law and competition policy may raise. An examination of the rather
rudimentary system of multilateral agreements on international enforcement and of the
increasing number of bi-lateral governmental agreements on cooperation in the field of
antitrust law shows that, even though these agreements have become ever more
sophisticated in moving from simple information to negative and even to positive comity,
they will not by themselves solve the problems. Bilateral cooperation is procedurally
imperfect, it minimizes, but does not exclude conflicts, and it works reasonably well only
between politically and economically equal partners. Prospects for international harmo~nisation, let alone for centralisation of merger control remain dim as there is neither a
consensus on the institutional framework nor on the rules of substantive law. Therefore,
the report concludes by a discussion of more modest approaches such as harmonisation
of procedures and settlement regimes for conflicts of jurisdiction. |
|---|