Éditorial
Significant changes in corporate governance may occur when firms face bankruptcy. First, as the worsening of performance becomes more and more obvious, stakeholders will modify their behavior towards the firm. Furthermore, once a bankruptcy procedure is filed (and especially in the case of reorga...
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| Hlavní autor: | |
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| Médium: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Jazyk: | Français |
| Vydáno: |
2002
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| On-line přístup: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Shrnutí: | Significant changes in corporate governance may occur when firms face bankruptcy.
First, as the worsening of performance becomes more and more obvious,
stakeholders will modify their behavior towards the firm. Furthermore, once a
bankruptcy procedure is filed (and especially in the case of reorganizations on which
we focus), a new balance of power is established by the provisions included in each
national bankruptcy law.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the legal treatment of bankruptcy and its impact
on corporate governance in a comparative perspective. For that purpose, we rely on
a broad definition of corporate governance i.e. one which emphasizes not only the
relation between top executives and shareholders but also takes into account the
influence of all stakeholders on managerial discretion. This is particularly relevant
for our research object because not only shareholders and top management but also
creditors, customers and usually employees bear the consequences of bankruptcy.
To understand the effects of bankruptcy on corporate governance, we first examine
the insolvency codes of five countries (i.e. France, Germany, Great-Britain, Japan
ant the United States). The stance of the law (rather favorable to the creditors or to
the debtor) is discussed in relation to the legal tradition of each country. We then
study the enforcement of the law, pointing to existing problems and current reforms. |
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