Wissenschaft keine reine Verstandessache: Ernst Mach et le Cercle de Vienne
For Margaret Cavendish knowledge in natural philosophy can only amount to probability and never to certainty. Cavendish’s probabilism might seem to echo some of the stances of the Royal Society on the uncertainty of knowledge in natural philosophy. However, Cavendish’s probabilism is grounded in her...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Langue: | Français |
| Publié: |
2025
|
| Accès en ligne: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | For Margaret Cavendish knowledge in natural philosophy can only amount to probability and never to certainty. Cavendish’s probabilism might seem to echo some of the stances of the Royal Society on the uncertainty of knowledge in natural philosophy. However, Cavendish’s probabilism is grounded in her metaphysical conception of nature and in the ontological properties she attributes to matter, which are in stark contrast with the empirical and experimental method of the Royal Society. Cavendish’s probabilism is metaphysically grounded insofar as she claims that the probabilistic nature of any discourses in natural philosophy can be explained by and integrated into her metaphysical conception of nature. Therefore, we should be careful when using Richard Popkin’s category of “constructive or mitigated scepticism” from his History of Scepticism to label Cavendish epistemology as it has been the case sometimes in the literature on Cavendish. |
|---|