Financial incentives to postpone retirement

This article analyses whether financial incentives to delay retirement affect the employment and wages of older workers, not just their retirement behavior. We focus on the outcomes of France’s 2003 reform that offered pension bonus to older workers who postponed their retirement until the legal age...

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Autores principales: Le Duigou, Sarah, Legendre, Bérangère, Sabatier, Mareva
Formato: Article ou chapitre numérique
Lenguaje:Français
Publicado: 2021
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Acceso en línea:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling cairn-REOF_170_0321REOFRevue de l'OFCE https://shs.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2020-6-page-321?lang=en https://doi.org/10.3917/reof.170.0321 Financial incentives to postpone retirement Le Duigou, SarahLegendre, BérangèreSabatier, Mareva2021 employmentendogenous wagesequilibrium search modelfinancial retirement incentivesfre Revue de l'OFCE | 170 | 6 | 2021-03-25 | p. 321-344 | 1265-9576 REOF_17062 This article analyses whether financial incentives to delay retirement affect the employment and wages of older workers, not just their retirement behavior. We focus on the outcomes of France’s 2003 reform that offered pension bonus to older workers who postponed their retirement until the legal age. An equilibrium search model is built in which both employment and wage are endogenous, allowing us to analyze the role of both labor supply and demand in the retirement decision. Simulations of the model show that some firms choose to post higher wages to induce their workers to work longer. Thanks to a higher retention, firms save recruitment and training costs. Finally, demand-side considerations can attenuate the impacts of financial incentives that cause wage increases and too few new jobs.Cairn free access
language Français
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/
topic employment
endogenous wages
equilibrium search model
financial retirement incentives
spellingShingle employment
endogenous wages
equilibrium search model
financial retirement incentives
Le Duigou, Sarah
Legendre, Bérangère
Sabatier, Mareva
Financial incentives to postpone retirement
topic_facet employment
endogenous wages
equilibrium search model
financial retirement incentives
description This article analyses whether financial incentives to delay retirement affect the employment and wages of older workers, not just their retirement behavior. We focus on the outcomes of France’s 2003 reform that offered pension bonus to older workers who postponed their retirement until the legal age. An equilibrium search model is built in which both employment and wage are endogenous, allowing us to analyze the role of both labor supply and demand in the retirement decision. Simulations of the model show that some firms choose to post higher wages to induce their workers to work longer. Thanks to a higher retention, firms save recruitment and training costs. Finally, demand-side considerations can attenuate the impacts of financial incentives that cause wage increases and too few new jobs.
author Le Duigou, Sarah
Legendre, Bérangère
Sabatier, Mareva
author_facet Le Duigou, Sarah
Legendre, Bérangère
Sabatier, Mareva
author_sort Le Duigou, Sarah
title Financial incentives to postpone retirement
title_short Financial incentives to postpone retirement
title_full Financial incentives to postpone retirement
title_fullStr Financial incentives to postpone retirement
title_full_unstemmed Financial incentives to postpone retirement
title_sort financial incentives to postpone retirement
publishDate 2021
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url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2020-6-page-321?lang=en
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/reof.170.0321
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