Une étude expérimentale de la forte stabilité
An Experimental Study of Strong Candidate Stability In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as defined by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election rema...
में बचाया:
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
|---|---|
| स्वरूप: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| भाषा: | Français |
| प्रकाशित: |
2014
|
| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| सारांश: | An Experimental Study of Strong Candidate Stability
In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as defined by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after an attempted manipulation by strategic candidacy of a potential candidate. In an election with three candidates and a small electorate, we evaluate experimentally frequencies of the strong candidate stability of parliamentary voting rules and plurality. JEL Classification: D71. |
|---|