Faites vos jeux ! L’aléa ludique et ses formes de détournement
This article suggests that, in a limited orbital environment, megasatellite constellations can be strategically scaled to discourage competitors from entering the market. It shows that an incumbent operator can deploy more satellites than are necessary for efficiency in order to increase congestion...
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Français |
| Udgivet: |
2017
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | This article suggests that, in a limited orbital environment, megasatellite constellations
can be strategically scaled to discourage competitors from entering the market. It
shows that an incumbent operator can deploy more satellites than are necessary for
efficiency in order to increase congestion and reduce the incentive to enter the market.
This oversizing reduces the lifespan of all satellites, including those of the incumbent
operator, but may nevertheless prove profitable if it preserves monopoly rents. This
study underscores that the regulation of space activities must be designed with both
environmental constraints and the competitive context in mind. It also complements
the existing literature on industrial organization by describing a new lever that grants a
first-mover advantage within the framework of a sequential investment game. |
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