Negotiating Upstream-Downstream Environmental Agreements
We consider the outcomes of two versions of the “Bargain with your neighbors” protocol for two upstream-downstream games: the Seawall game (Delille and Pereau [2014]) and the Great Lakes game (Becker and Easter [1999]). In such a protocol, bilateral bargaining takes place with the players that are l...
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| Principais autores: | , |
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| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicado em: |
2026
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Resumo: | We consider the outcomes of two versions of the “Bargain with your neighbors” protocol for two upstream-downstream games: the Seawall game (Delille and Pereau
[2014]) and the Great Lakes game (Becker and Easter [1999]). In such a protocol, bilateral bargaining takes place with the players that are located immediately upstream or
downstream (neighbors). While in the first version players bargain over actions and
transfers simultaneously, in the second version players commit to an action if the
subsequent negotiation over transfers is successful. We obtain different outcomes
depending on the players’ beliefs about what happens when there is disagreement at
one bargaining. The socially optimal outcome is obtained when players pre-commit
actions and bargain over transfers in the case where one disagreement implies global
disagreement. This implies that the institutional rule of the Great Lakes granting veto
power to all its members is a necessary condition to reach socially optimal outcomes. |
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