Learning and governance in inter-firm relations
This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. Two kinds of relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk. For...
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprache: | Français |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2004
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| Online Zugang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Zusammenfassung: | This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of
inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics
(TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. Two kinds of relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of
relational risk, the article presents a set of instruments that includes trust, next to
instruments adopted and adapted from TCE. It also includes roles for go-betweens.
Some references to empirical evidence are included. |
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