L’anti-démocratie au XXIe siècle. Iran, Russie, Turquie
Wittfogel’s hydraulic hypothesis has long been criticized, especially by China scholars. However, a glance at the archaeological and written records of hydraulic engineering in early China suffices to note the correlation between the scale of water management and significant upgrades in state power....
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Français |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Riassunto: | Wittfogel’s hydraulic hypothesis has long been criticized, especially by China scholars. However, a glance at the archaeological and written records of hydraulic engineering in early China suffices to note the correlation between the scale of water management and significant upgrades in state power. In this essay, I argue that despite the importance of water management at critical points in the socio-political history of ancient China, hydraulic regulation was rarely the driving force of state organization. It could be a potent tool in the hands of state-builders, but people could also construct and operate large water infrastructures in the lack of “despotic” rulers, while powerful, highly centralized states could emerge in environments where such infrastructures did not exist. To show this, I focus on three transitions in state power: the emergence of complex societies with high levels of centralization in the Yangzi Basin in the later fourth and third millennium BCE; the development of bureaucratic states in the mid-first millennium BCE; and the empire formation during the last two centuries BCE and the first two centuries CE. |
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