Comment un État rebelle s’insère-t-il dans un marché régulé ? Le cas de la république corse (xviiie siècle)

This article explores the « paradox of authority » faced by Corsican revolutionaries : to establish themselves as a coercive power and, at the same time, exert a seductive force on the population and, more specifically, on market actors. Our analysis examines by what means the rebel proto-state led...

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Bibliographic Details
In:Histoire, économie & société | 44e aée | 4 | 2025-12-09 | p. 4-18 | 0752-5702
Main Author: Miceli, Erick
Format: Article ou chapitre numérique
Language:Français
Published: 2025
Online Access:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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Summary:This article explores the « paradox of authority » faced by Corsican revolutionaries : to establish themselves as a coercive power and, at the same time, exert a seductive force on the population and, more specifically, on market actors. Our analysis examines by what means the rebel proto-state led by Pascal Paoli (1755-1769) manages to insert itself into the market as a regulator and, ultimately, as a fully legitimate state over its territory. Our reflection thus invites to place the Corsican war against the Republic of Genoa in the background : we can thus underline the idea that a state, more than being fought against, must be replaced on a territory.