La patrimonialisation des charges parlementaires au Japon

Patrimonialization of Parliamentary Responsibilities in Japan The issue of « patrimonialization of Parliamentary office » is at the core of the reflection on the mode of production and reproduction of Japanese political elites since the 1990s. Though the phenomenon may be relatively old, the inc...

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Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Seizelet, Éric
Μορφή: Article ou chapitre numérique
Γλώσσα:Français
Έκδοση: 2007
Διαθέσιμο Online:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Περιγραφή
Περίληψη:Patrimonialization of Parliamentary Responsibilities in Japan The issue of « patrimonialization of Parliamentary office » is at the core of the reflection on the mode of production and reproduction of Japanese political elites since the 1990s. Though the phenomenon may be relatively old, the increase of power of “hereditary members of parliament”, both in the Diet and government, is often presented as one of the major elements of the Japanese political system and is largely criticized in the national media as a proof that the mode of formation of the political class is both archaic and hermetic. What reasons can explain among the political culture, the voting system and the electoral behaviours, the space occupied in the corridors of power by “heirs”, and singularly big parliamentary dynasties? This paper questions the electoral results of hereditary members of Parliament, and analyzes the typological evolutions of their family and socio-professional backgrounds from a diachronic point of view. It also assesses the complexity of their political role, considering that they are both factors of stabilization for the conservative elites in a context of greater volatility of electoral attitudes, and specific but essential elements of political stimulation. Hereditary members of parliament are indeed the only ones to possess political and financial resources as well as a network of contacts that enable them to engage structural reforms without having to pay the electoral price. More than just a conventional image, there is a complex configuration: if these members of Parliament are numerous enough to offer a diversification of the political class excessively described as being dominated by the bureaucratic apparatus, they are not enough to be able to escape from the tacit rules of political promotion. But if they participate, in a way, to the consolidation of elites in power, the forces that sporadically have made things change in the Japanese political system came from their ranks.