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« Loser Pays » European Law of State aid as punitive code For reasons going far beyond economic analysis, European law on competition loathes state aid to companies in difficulty. A case study on the rescue of the Credit Lyonnais reveals the principle: the Commission criticises the fact that be...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Langue: | Français |
| Publié: |
2007
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| Accès en ligne: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | « Loser Pays » European Law of State aid as punitive
code
For reasons going far beyond economic analysis, European
law on competition loathes state aid to companies in difficulty. A case study
on the rescue of the Credit Lyonnais reveals the principle: the Commission
criticises the fact that because companies know they can benefit from state
aid, they take rash risks without assuming the consequences. State assistance
is blameworthy insofar as it goes against the “moral rule of the market”
according to which bankruptcy is the normal sanction of poor management.
Therefore, the Commission stigmatizes less the distortions to competition
generated by state aid than what is viewed as far more reprehensible forms of
distortion: market ethics and the natural business life and death. The considerable guarantees the Commission requests before it authorizes aid can be
seen as a sort of punishment substituted for the pains of bankruptcy or restructuring that the company “normally” would have had to face. |
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