Hégémonie américaine et marché mondial
The US economy emerged as the dominant power after World War II, but it was not integrated in the world economy as had been the case for England in the British centered global market. The government played a central role in the formation of a new international economy under US hegemony. Thus, only t...
Sparad:
| Huvudupphovsmän: | , |
|---|---|
| Materialtyp: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Språk: | Français |
| Publicerad: |
2000
|
| Länkar: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sammanfattning: | The US economy emerged as the dominant power after World War II, but it was not integrated in the world economy as had been the case for England in the British centered global market. The government played a central role in the formation of a new international economy under US hegemony. Thus, only the expansion of armament during the Cold War solved the liquidity problem of the postwar economy, allowing for a period of exceptional expansion. With the crisis of the 1970s, the accumulation of capital grew faster than what could be reinvested productively, and capital flew toward financial investment and speculation, creating an abundance of liquidity, threatening the stability of the system. In the early 1980s, the situation changed radically, with a new scarcity of capital and returns on financial investments reaching unprecedented levels, following a reversal of policy in the US, the state becoming the most faithful supporter of financial interests. Thus, the US replicated the earlier British, Dutch, and Genoese experiences, where financial expansions had appeared as closing moments of successive stages in the formation of the global market. |
|---|