De l'autogestion au socialisme associatif
Economists have raised a number of objections to economic self-management, casting doubt on its efficiency. The two models sketched in this paper are meant to answer such objections. In them, capital is rented by the workforce through the medium of self-managed banks, from a public investment fund (...
Tallennettuna:
| Päätekijät: | , |
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| Aineistotyyppi: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Kieli: | Français |
| Julkaistu: |
1993
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| Linkit: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Yhteenveto: | Economists have raised a number of objections to economic self-management, casting doubt on its efficiency. The two models sketched in this paper are meant to answer such objections. In them, capital is rented by the workforce through the medium of self-managed banks, from a public investment fund (financed by the interest paid by the firms, and also by tax) andlor households. This entirely external (self-funding is prohibited) and indirect funding (there are no longer shares or bonds) minimizes the risk of under-investment. The work market is linked to an insurance system, and subject to a national, centrally negociated standard. The market for commodities is preserved, but competition is tempered with cooperation. Planning is indirect and works through incentive. Not only do such models provide more democracy and greater equality, while improving productivity - they also include mechanisms and trends favouring full employment, a decrease in the growth of commodity production, and a more harmonious and satisfactory form of development. |
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