Unelected power : the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state
Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from t...
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| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | Livre numérique |
| 語言: | Anglais |
| 出版: |
Princeton, N.J. [etc.] :
Princeton University Press
2019.
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | Accès Université Orléans et IFPM |
| 提示: |
Couverture. https://static2.cyberlibris.com/books_upload/136pix/9780691196985.jpg Titre provenant de la page de titre du document numérique La pagination de l'édition imprimée correspondante est de 663 p. Cyberlibris (ScholarVox) corpus sciences économiques et gestion |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Unelected power, the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state, Paul Tucker, 2018, Princeton, N.J. [etc.], Princeton University Press, 1 vol. (xii-642 p.), 978-0-691-17673-4 |
| 總結: | Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.-- (jaquette) |
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| Item Description: | Couverture. https://static2.cyberlibris.com/books_upload/136pix/9780691196985.jpg Titre provenant de la page de titre du document numérique La pagination de l'édition imprimée correspondante est de 663 p. Cyberlibris (ScholarVox) corpus sciences économiques et gestion |
| 格式: | Configuration requise : navigateur internet |
| 參考書目: | Bibliogr. p. [579]-610. Notes bibliogr. Index |
| ISBN: | 9780691196985 |
| 訪問: | L'accès en ligne est réservé aux établissements ou bibliothèques ayant souscrit l'abonnement. Cyberlibris |