Subgame consistent economic optimization : an advanced cooperative dynamic game analysis

The prevalence of imperfect structures, externalities, and imperfect information in existing market systems prevents the market from serving as an efficient mechanism for resource allocation. In the presence of such failures, optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Yeung, David W. K., 1955-, Petrosyan, Leon A., 19..- (Auteur)
Format: Livre numérique
Langue:Anglais
Publié: Boston, MA : Birkhäuser Boston : Imprint: Birkhäuser [20..].
Cham : Springer Nature
Collection:Static & dynamic game theory : foundations & applications
Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications
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Accès Université d'Orléans
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Note: Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale)
Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale)
Autres localisations: Voir dans le Sudoc
Edition sous un autre format:• Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization, Texte imprimé, 9780817682613
Table des matières:
  • Preface Introduction.- 1 Dynamic Strategic Interactions in Economic System.- 2 Dynamic Economic Optimization: Group Optimality and Individual Rationality 3 Time Consistency and Optimal-Trajectory-Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization 4 Dynamically Stable Cost-saving Joint Venture 5 Collaborative Environmental Management 6 Dynamically Stable Dormant Firm Cartel 7 Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization Under Uncertainty 8 Cost-saving Joint Venture Under Uncertainty 9 Collaborative Environmental Management Under Uncertainty 10 Subgame Consistent Dormant Firm Cartel 11 Dynamic Consistency in Discrete-time Cooperative Games 12 Discrete-time Cooperative Games Under Uncertainty Technical Appendices References Index