Subgame consistent economic optimization : an advanced cooperative dynamic game analysis
The prevalence of imperfect structures, externalities, and imperfect information in existing market systems prevents the market from serving as an efficient mechanism for resource allocation. In the presence of such failures, optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure...
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Livre numérique |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Publié: |
Boston, MA :
Birkhäuser Boston : Imprint: Birkhäuser
[20..].
Cham : Springer Nature |
| Collection: | Static & dynamic game theory : foundations & applications
Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications |
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | Accès sur la plateforme de l'éditeur Accès sur la plateforme Istex Accès Université d'Orléans Accès INSA CVL |
| Note: |
Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization, Texte imprimé, 9780817682613 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Yeung, David W. K., |d 1955- | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Subgame consistent economic optimization : |b an advanced cooperative dynamic game analysis |c by David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan. |
| 260 | |a Boston, MA : |b Birkhäuser Boston : |b Imprint: Birkhäuser. | ||
| 260 | |a Cham : |b Springer Nature, |c [20..]. | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Static & dynamic game theory : foundations & applications | |
| 490 | 0 | |a Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications | |
| 500 | |a Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) | ||
| 500 | |a Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) | ||
| 505 | 1 | |a Preface Introduction.- 1 Dynamic Strategic Interactions in Economic System.- 2 Dynamic Economic Optimization: Group Optimality and Individual Rationality 3 Time Consistency and Optimal-Trajectory-Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization 4 Dynamically Stable Cost-saving Joint Venture 5 Collaborative Environmental Management 6 Dynamically Stable Dormant Firm Cartel 7 Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization Under Uncertainty 8 Cost-saving Joint Venture Under Uncertainty 9 Collaborative Environmental Management Under Uncertainty 10 Subgame Consistent Dormant Firm Cartel 11 Dynamic Consistency in Discrete-time Cooperative Games 12 Discrete-time Cooperative Games Under Uncertainty Technical Appendices References Index | |
| 506 | |a Accès en ligne pour les établissements français bénéficiaires des licences nationales | ||
| 506 | |a Accès soumis à abonnement pour tout autre établissement | ||
| 506 | |a Conditions particulières de réutilisation pour les bénéficiaires des licences nationales. https://www.licencesnationales.fr/springer-nature-ebooks-contrat-licence-ln-2017 | ||
| 520 | |a The prevalence of imperfect structures, externalities, and imperfect information in existing market systems prevents the market from serving as an efficient mechanism for resource allocation. In the presence of such failures, optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimization suggests the possibility of socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time; however, to guarantee that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required. This textbook presents a treatise on subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle sub-optimal circumstances that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve. Topics covered include: * dynamic optimization; * group optimality and individual rationality; * time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent economic optimization; * dynamic economic optimization under uncertainty and subgame consistency; * dynamically stable joint ventures; * collaborative environmental management; * discrete-time subgame consistent economic optimization. This is the first book to thoroughly address the topic of subgame consistent economic optimization. It will be of particular interest as a research reference for game theorists, economists, mathematicians, policy makers, and corporate planners. With ample problems and exercises, it is also a useful text for graduate students in game theory | ||
| 650 | |a Théorie des jeux | ||
| 650 | |a Optimisation mathématique | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Petrosyan, Leon A., |d 19..- |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | |t Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization |b Texte imprimé |z 9780817682613 | |
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