Advances in Cryptology : Proceedings of CRYPTO 84
Recently, there has been a lot of interest in provably "good" pseudo-random number generators [lo, 4, 14, 31. These cryptographically secure generators are "good" in the sense that they pass all probabilistic polynomial time statistical tests. However, despite these nice properti...
Salvato in:
| Ente Autore: | |
|---|---|
| Altri autori: | , |
| Natura: | Livre numérique |
| Lingua: | Anglais |
| Pubblicazione: |
Berlin [etc.] :
Springer
[20..].
Cham : Springer Nature |
| Serie: | Lecture notes in computer science
196 |
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | Accès sur la plateforme de l'éditeur Accès sur la plateforme Istex Accès Université d'Orléans Accès INSA CVL |
| Nota: |
Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Advances in cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO 84, Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques, held at the University of California, Santa Barbara, August 19-22, 1984, 1985, Berlin, Springer, 1 vol. (VIII-491 p.), Lecture notes in computer science, 3-540-15658-5 • Advances in Cryptology, Texte imprimé, 9783662177624 |
| Riassunto: | Recently, there has been a lot of interest in provably "good" pseudo-random number generators [lo, 4, 14, 31. These cryptographically secure generators are "good" in the sense that they pass all probabilistic polynomial time statistical tests. However, despite these nice properties, the secure generators known so far suffer from the han- cap of being inefiicient; the most efiicient of these take n2 steps (one modular multip- cation, n being the length of the seed) to generate one bit. Pseudc-random number g- erators that are currently used in practice output n bits per multiplication (n2 steps). An important open problem was to output even two bits on each multiplication in a cryptographically secure way. This problem was stated by Blum, Blum & Shub [3] in the context of their z2 mod N generator. They further ask: how many bits can be o- put per multiplication, maintaining cryptographic security? In this paper we state a simple condition, the XOR-Condition and show that any generator satisfying this condition can output logn bits on each multiplication. We show that the XOR-Condition is satisfied by the lop least significant bits of the z2-mod N generator. The security of the z2 mod N generator was based on Quadratic Residu- ity [3]. This generator is an example of a Trapdoor Generator [13], and its trapdoor properties have been used in protocol design. We strengthen the security of this gene- tor by proving it as hard as factoring. |
|---|---|
| Descrizione del documento: | Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| ISBN: | 9783540395683 (PDF) |
| ISSN: | 1611-3349 |
| Accesso: | Accès en ligne pour les établissements français bénéficiaires des licences nationales Accès soumis à abonnement pour tout autre établissement Conditions particulières de réutilisation pour les bénéficiaires des licences nationales. https://www.licencesnationales.fr/springer-nature-ebooks-contrat-licence-ln-2017 |