Advances in cryptology - CRYPTO 87 : proceedings
Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a languag...
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| 第一著者: | |
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| 団体著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Livre numérique |
| 言語: | Anglais |
| 出版事項: |
Berlin [etc.] :
Springer
2003.
Cham : Springer Nature |
| シリーズ: | Lecture notes in computer science
293 |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Accès sur la plateforme de l'éditeur Accès sur la plateforme Istex Accès Université d'Orléans Accès INSA CVL |
| 注記: |
Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Advances in cryptology--CRYPTO '87, proceedings, Carl Pomerance (ed.), Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1988, 1 vol. (460 p.), Lecture notes in computer science, 0-387-18796-0 • Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87, Texte imprimé, 9783540800217 |
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| 009 | PPN155187872 | ||
| 020 | |a 9783540481843 (PDF) | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 082 | |a 004 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Pomerance, Carl, |d 19..- | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Advances in cryptology - CRYPTO 87 : |b proceedings |c [edited by] Carl Pomerance. |
| 260 | |a Berlin [etc.] : |b Springer. | ||
| 260 | |a Cham : |b Springer Nature, |c 2003. | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Lecture notes in computer science |v 293 |x 1611-3349 | |
| 500 | |a Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) | ||
| 500 | |a Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Communication Networks and Standards -- Standards for Data Security a Change of Direction -- Integrating Cryptography in ISDN -- Protocols -- Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract) -- Direct Minimum-Knowledge Computations (Extended Abstract) -- Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems -- How to Solve any Protocol Problem - An Efficiency Improvement (Extended Abstract) -- Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party s Input and Correctness of the Result -- Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: a New Concept -- A Simple and Secure Way to Show the Validity of Your Public Key -- Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Protocols and the Public-Key Model (Extended Abstract) -- Gradual and Verifiable Release of a Secret (Extended Abstract) -- Strong Practical Protocols -- Key Distribution Systems -- Identity-based conference key distribution systems -- On the KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: A Practical Solution to the Key Distribution Problem -- Key Distribution Systems Based on Identification Information -- Secret Distribution of Keys for Public-Key Systems -- Public Key Systems -- An Impersonation-Proof Identity Verification Scheme -- Arbitration in Tamper Proof Systems -- Efficient Digital Public-Key Signatures with Shadow -- Security-Related Comments Regarding McEliece s Public-Key Cryptosystem -- Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Systems -- Components and Cycles of a Random Function -- Fast Spectral Tests for Measuring Nonrandomness and the DES -- Other Cycling Tests for DES -- A Crypto-Engine -- A Natural Taxonomy for Digital Information Authentication Schemes -- Analyzing Encryption Protocols Using Formal Verification Techniques (Extended Abstract) -- Cryptosystems based on an analog of heat flow -- A Combinatorial Approach toThreshold Schemes -- A Realization Scheme for the Identity-Based Cryptosystem -- Equivalence Between Two Flavours of Oblivious Transfers -- A construction for authentication / secrecy codes from certain combinatorial designs -- Applications -- A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function -- How to Make Replicated Data Secure -- A Study of Password Security -- A Video Scrambling Technique Based On Space Filling Curves (Extended Abstract) -- Secure Audio Teleconference -- Informal Contributions -- Attack on the Koyama-Ohta Identity Based Key Distribution Scheme -- On the F-function of FEAL -- Patterns of Entropy Drop of the Key in an S-Box of the DES (Extended Abtract) -- The Rao-Nam Scheme is Insecure Against a Chosen-Plaintext Attack -- On Struik-Tilburg Cryptanalysis of Rao-Nam Scheme -- A Generalization of Hellman s Extension of Shannon s Approach to Cryptography (Abstract) -- Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols (Abstract). | |
| 506 | |a Accès en ligne pour les établissements français bénéficiaires des licences nationales | ||
| 506 | |a Accès soumis à abonnement pour tout autre établissement | ||
| 506 | |a Conditions particulières de réutilisation pour les bénéficiaires des licences nationales. https://www.licencesnationales.fr/springer-nature-ebooks-contrat-licence-ln-2017 | ||
| 520 | |a Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability. | ||
| 650 | |a Informatique | ||
| 650 | |a Cryptographie | ||
| 650 | |a Chiffrement (informatique) | ||
| 650 | |a Systèmes informatiques | ||
| 650 | |a Mesures de sûreté | ||
| 650 | |a Actes de congrès | ||
| 711 | 2 | |a Annual international cryptology conference |d (1987 |c :Santa Barbara, Calif.). |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | |0 020588690 |t Advances in cryptology--CRYPTO '87 |o proceedings |f Carl Pomerance (ed.) |c Berlin |n Springer-Verlag |d 1988 |p 1 vol. (460 p.) |s Lecture notes in computer science |z 0-387-18796-0 | |
| 776 | 0 | |t Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87 |b Texte imprimé |z 9783540800217 | |
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| 856 | 4 | |u https://revue-sommaire.istex.fr/ark:/67375/8Q1-KP1HN43B-K |z Accès sur la plateforme Istex | |
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| 997 | |0 970299 |1 Livre numérique |a Ressource numérique |b INSA |b ENSA |c 0/Bibliothèque numérique/ |c 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Autre ressource numérique/ | ||