Advances in cryptology - CRYPTO 87 : proceedings
Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a languag...
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| Autor corporatiu: | |
| Format: | Livre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicat: |
Berlin [etc.] :
Springer
2003.
Cham : Springer Nature |
| Col·lecció: | Lecture notes in computer science
293 |
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| Accés en línia: | Accès sur la plateforme de l'éditeur Accès sur la plateforme Istex Accès Université d'Orléans Accès INSA CVL |
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Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Advances in cryptology--CRYPTO '87, proceedings, Carl Pomerance (ed.), Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1988, 1 vol. (460 p.), Lecture notes in computer science, 0-387-18796-0 • Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87, Texte imprimé, 9783540800217 |
| Sumari: | Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability. |
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| Descripció de l’ítem: | Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| ISBN: | 9783540481843 (PDF) |
| ISSN: | 1611-3349 |
| Accés: | Accès en ligne pour les établissements français bénéficiaires des licences nationales Accès soumis à abonnement pour tout autre établissement Conditions particulières de réutilisation pour les bénéficiaires des licences nationales. https://www.licencesnationales.fr/springer-nature-ebooks-contrat-licence-ln-2017 |