The Arrow Impossibility Theorem
Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship...
Kaydedildi:
| Asıl Yazarlar: | , |
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| Materyal Türü: | Livre numérique |
| Dil: | Anglais |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
New York, NY :
Columbia University Press
[2014].
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| Konular: | |
| Online Erişim: | Accès Université Orléans et IFPM |
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Eric Maskin is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University. He received the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson) for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. He has also contributed to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics.Amartya Sen is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. In 1998 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 1999 he was awarded the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award. He is also a senior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows; distinguished fellow of All Souls College, Oxford; and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His books have been translated into more than thirty languages Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed September 10 2015) La pagination de l'édition imprimée correspondante est de : 168 p. Cyberlibris (ScholarVox) corpus sciences économiques et gestion |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Özet: | Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal--given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions |
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| Diğer Bilgileri: | Eric Maskin is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University. He received the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson) for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. He has also contributed to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics.Amartya Sen is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. In 1998 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 1999 he was awarded the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award. He is also a senior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows; distinguished fellow of All Souls College, Oxford; and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His books have been translated into more than thirty languages Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed September 10 2015) La pagination de l'édition imprimée correspondante est de : 168 p. Cyberlibris (ScholarVox) corpus sciences économiques et gestion |
| Materyal Türü: | Nécessite un navigateur et un lecteur de fichier PDF |
| ISBN: | 9780231526869 |
| Erişim: | L'accès complet à la ressource est réservé aux usagers des établissements qui en ont fait l'acquisition |