Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom
The paper distinguishes two accounts of the relationship between individual and political freedom: the Disunity View (according to which personal and political freedom are not only conceptually distinct but are also incompatible) and the Unity View (which assumes that personal and political freedom...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autors principals: | , |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
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Revus
2020
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:revus_6331 |
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openedition |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:revus_6331 https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.6331 urn:doi:10.4000/revus.6331 en https://journals.openedition.org/revus/6331 2020-12-11T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/k0oz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom Revus Klub Revus info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1855-7112 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1581-7652 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus Eliasz, Katarzyna Załuski, Wojciech libertas life in freedom political rights liberal democracy political freedom personal freedom The paper distinguishes two accounts of the relationship between individual and political freedom: the Disunity View (according to which personal and political freedom are not only conceptually distinct but are also incompatible) and the Unity View (which assumes that personal and political freedom are conceptually inseparable, and that thereby freedom is a unitary concept – reminiscent of the Roman-republican libertas). The aim of this paper is to provide several arguments for the Unity View (psychological, conceptual, ‘republican’, and discourse-theoretic). We also argue that the Unity View entails what Ortega y Gasset labeled “life in freedom” (a condition whereby state coercion is not experienced as a limitation of freedom) and that it provides an additional (freedom-based) justification for liberal/constitutional democracy. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Anglais |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| topic |
libertas life in freedom political rights liberal democracy political freedom personal freedom |
| spellingShingle |
libertas life in freedom political rights liberal democracy political freedom personal freedom Eliasz, Katarzyna Załuski, Wojciech Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom |
| description |
The paper distinguishes two accounts of the relationship between individual and political freedom: the Disunity View (according to which personal and political freedom are not only conceptually distinct but are also incompatible) and the Unity View (which assumes that personal and political freedom are conceptually inseparable, and that thereby freedom is a unitary concept – reminiscent of the Roman-republican libertas). The aim of this paper is to provide several arguments for the Unity View (psychological, conceptual, ‘republican’, and discourse-theoretic). We also argue that the Unity View entails what Ortega y Gasset labeled “life in freedom” (a condition whereby state coercion is not experienced as a limitation of freedom) and that it provides an additional (freedom-based) justification for liberal/constitutional democracy. |
| author |
Eliasz, Katarzyna Załuski, Wojciech |
| author_facet |
Eliasz, Katarzyna Załuski, Wojciech |
| author_sort |
Eliasz, Katarzyna |
| title |
Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom |
| title_short |
Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom |
| title_full |
Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom |
| title_fullStr |
Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Libertas: On the unity of the concept of freedom |
| title_sort |
libertas: on the unity of the concept of freedom |
| publisher |
Revus |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.6331 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/revus/6331 |
| _version_ |
1877293798690652160 |