Against the conversational model of legal interpretation
The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-calle...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicat: |
Revus
2020
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |