Hatred, determinism, and control
Many legal philosophers are sceptical about the justification for aggravating punishment based on motives. I argue that these sceptical positions may overlook an important dimension of moral and legal responsibility in that responsibility for motives does not hinge on "volitional control"...
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| Vydáno v: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Jazyk: | Anglais |
| Vydáno: |
Revus
2026
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |