How (not) to do things with a contract

Legal theory has strong accounts of why defective legal acts fail. It has a weaker account of why legal systems respond to that failure in categorically different ways. Speech act theory addresses the first question, and legal theorists have drawn on it because it converges with Hart’s insight that...

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Publicado no:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus,
Autor principal: Ataoğlu, Seren
Formato: Article ou chapitre numérique
Idioma:Anglais
Publicado em: Revus 2026
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Acesso em linha:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
id openedition-oai:revues.org:revus_13021
record_format openedition
spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:revus_13021 https://doi.org/10.4000/16n5k urn:doi:10.4000/16n5k en https://journals.openedition.org/revus/13021 2026-07-30T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/16n5k https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ How (not) to do things with a contract Revus Klub Revus info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1855-7112 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1581-7652 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus Ataoğlu, Seren teorija govornih dejanj pravni posli neveljavnost normativna sodba speech act theory; juridical acts; invalidity; normative judgment Legal theory has strong accounts of why defective legal acts fail. It has a weaker account of why legal systems respond to that failure in categorically different ways. Speech act theory addresses the first question, and legal theorists have drawn on it because it converges with Hart’s insight that nullity is not a sanction. But these frameworks share a structural limitation: binary outcomes. Civil law distinguishes categories of invalidity—nonexistence, absolute nullity, relative nullity—each with distinct procedural consequences. This article argues that speech act theory cannot capture these categories. First, it shows both classical and cooperative accounts produce Boolean outcomes. Second, it demonstrates that civil law assigns defects to discrete categories. Third, it establishes that this assignment tracks normative judgments about protected values, not structural features. Fourth, it responds to objections, including graded speech acts. Even non-binary frameworks cannot supply the evaluative judgments the law’s taxonomy of invalidity requires. Kako napraviti kaj (in ne napraviti česa) s pogodbo. Pravna teorija ponuja prepričljive razlage, zakaj pomanjkljivi pravni akti ne učinkujejo. Šibkejša pa je pri pojasnjevanju, zakaj se pravni sistemi na takšne pomanjkljivosti odzivajo na tako različne načine. Teorija govornih dejanj odgovarja na prvo vprašanje, zato so se pravni teoretiki pogosto oprli nanjo, saj se ujema s Hartovim uvidom, da ničnost ni sankcija. Vendar imata oba pristopa skupno strukturno omejitev: predpostavljata binarne izide. Civilno pravo pa razlikuje med različnimi kategorijami neveljavnosti – neobstojem, absolutno ničnostjo in izpodbojnostjo – pri čemer ima vsaka svoje posebne procesne posledice. Članek zagovarja tezo, da teorija govornih dejanj teh kategorij ne more ustrezno pojasniti. Najprej pokaže, da tako klasične kot kooperativne različice teorije govornih dejanj vodijo do binarnih izidov. Nato prikaže, da civilno pravo razloge neveljavnosti razvršča v diskretne kategorije. V tretjem koraku utemelji, da to razvrščanje ne sledi strukturnim značilnostim razlogov neveljavnosti, temveč normativnim sodbam o pravno varovanih vrednotah. Nazadnje odgovori na ugovore, med drugim na poskuse razlage s stopnjevanimi govornimi dejanji. Izkaže se, da tudi nebinarni modeli ne morejo zagotoviti vrednostnih sodb, na katerih temelji civilnopravna taksonomija neveljavnosti.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic teorija govornih dejanj
pravni posli
neveljavnost
normativna sodba
speech act theory; juridical acts; invalidity; normative judgment
spellingShingle teorija govornih dejanj
pravni posli
neveljavnost
normativna sodba
speech act theory; juridical acts; invalidity; normative judgment
Ataoğlu, Seren
How (not) to do things with a contract
description Legal theory has strong accounts of why defective legal acts fail. It has a weaker account of why legal systems respond to that failure in categorically different ways. Speech act theory addresses the first question, and legal theorists have drawn on it because it converges with Hart’s insight that nullity is not a sanction. But these frameworks share a structural limitation: binary outcomes. Civil law distinguishes categories of invalidity—nonexistence, absolute nullity, relative nullity—each with distinct procedural consequences. This article argues that speech act theory cannot capture these categories. First, it shows both classical and cooperative accounts produce Boolean outcomes. Second, it demonstrates that civil law assigns defects to discrete categories. Third, it establishes that this assignment tracks normative judgments about protected values, not structural features. Fourth, it responds to objections, including graded speech acts. Even non-binary frameworks cannot supply the evaluative judgments the law’s taxonomy of invalidity requires.
author Ataoğlu, Seren
author_facet Ataoğlu, Seren
author_sort Ataoğlu, Seren
title How (not) to do things with a contract
title_short How (not) to do things with a contract
title_full How (not) to do things with a contract
title_fullStr How (not) to do things with a contract
title_full_unstemmed How (not) to do things with a contract
title_sort how (not) to do things with a contract
publisher Revus
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/16n5k
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/revus/13021
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