Epistemic constitutionalism
In this paper, I argue that two types of reasoning often regarded as pertaining only to questions of law actually require addressing questions of fact as well. The first of these occurs when we argue that a rule cannot apply to a concrete case because doing so would be contrary to the rule’s purpose...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicat: |
Revus
2026
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |