Solving the « selective intervention » puzzle
This paper discusses the way in which the economic literature has solved Williamson’s selective intervention puzzle: why is that vertical integration, which gives the purchasing firm more control over its trading partner, not always more profitable than vertical separation? I argue that all the mode...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/rei, |
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| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Anglais |
| منشور في: |
Revue d’économie industrielle
2011
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |