Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge

Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge

One of the most venerable distinctions in philosophy is the one between knowledge and belief. Knowledge has been typically associated with genuine or scientific cognition that can provide truth whereas belief has been thought to present mere appearances or subjective opinion, usually founded on sens...

Täydet tiedot

Tallennettuna:
Bibliografiset tiedot
Julkaisussa:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref,
Päätekijä: Kim, Halla
Aineistotyyppi: Article ou chapitre numérique
Kieli:Anglais
Julkaistu: Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 2026
Aiheet:
Fichte
Kant
belief
knowledge
postulate
Linkit:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
id openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_895
record_format openedition
spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_895 https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.895 urn:doi:10.4000/ref.895 en https://journals.openedition.org/ref/895 2026-06-09T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/jqf4 All rights reserved Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2258-014X URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref Kim, Halla Fichte Kant belief knowledge postulate One of the most venerable distinctions in philosophy is the one between knowledge and belief. Knowledge has been typically associated with genuine or scientific cognition that can provide truth whereas belief has been thought to present mere appearances or subjective opinion, usually founded on sense perceptions. In this paper, I will argue that for both Kant and Fichte, this standard view is mistaken and that they present belief (Glaube) as more important than knowledge. Even though Kant admits that knowledge is prior, and superior, to belief as well as opinion in their purely epistemic dimension, he nevertheless ends up holding that belief in the more significant sense of a ‘postulate,’ is more important than knowledge. I will also argue that this is the fundamental point of his well-known doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. The standard view is also challenged by Fichte’s thoroughgoing transformation of our epistemic enterprise. According to Fichte, belief (Glaube) is prior to knowledge (Wissen), since it has something to do with “a resolution of the will” to admit the validity of knowledge. Belief here is equated with the practical act of the self that expresses its true nature as Tathandlung. In the course of the paper, I will also show that Kant and Fichte seem to argue for their view in a different way. For Kant, the superiority of belief is presented as part of his architectonic concern, i.e., as an answer to the question “what may I hope” in the context of his elaborate theory of postulates. For Fichte, the doctrine is presented as part of his transcendental-ontological project of securing the reality of the self and the world from our moral vocation.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic Fichte
Kant
belief
knowledge
postulate
spellingShingle Fichte
Kant
belief
knowledge
postulate
Kim, Halla
Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge
description One of the most venerable distinctions in philosophy is the one between knowledge and belief. Knowledge has been typically associated with genuine or scientific cognition that can provide truth whereas belief has been thought to present mere appearances or subjective opinion, usually founded on sense perceptions. In this paper, I will argue that for both Kant and Fichte, this standard view is mistaken and that they present belief (Glaube) as more important than knowledge. Even though Kant admits that knowledge is prior, and superior, to belief as well as opinion in their purely epistemic dimension, he nevertheless ends up holding that belief in the more significant sense of a ‘postulate,’ is more important than knowledge. I will also argue that this is the fundamental point of his well-known doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. The standard view is also challenged by Fichte’s thoroughgoing transformation of our epistemic enterprise. According to Fichte, belief (Glaube) is prior to knowledge (Wissen), since it has something to do with “a resolution of the will” to admit the validity of knowledge. Belief here is equated with the practical act of the self that expresses its true nature as Tathandlung. In the course of the paper, I will also show that Kant and Fichte seem to argue for their view in a different way. For Kant, the superiority of belief is presented as part of his architectonic concern, i.e., as an answer to the question “what may I hope” in the context of his elaborate theory of postulates. For Fichte, the doctrine is presented as part of his transcendental-ontological project of securing the reality of the self and the world from our moral vocation.
author Kim, Halla
author_facet Kim, Halla
author_sort Kim, Halla
title Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge
title_short Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge
title_full Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge
title_fullStr Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge
title_full_unstemmed Kant and Fichte on Belief and Knowledge
title_sort kant and fichte on belief and knowledge
publisher Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.895
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ref/895
_version_ 1877291674335444993

Samankaltaisia teoksia