Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte

Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte

Fichte's mature conception of transcendental freedom is the subject of some controversy. This paper hopes to shed light on Fichte's later conception by examining his earliest thoughts on the matter. The focus is on three pivotal years of Fichte's development between 1791 and 1793: A....

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Hlavní autor: Wells, Aaron
Médium: Article ou chapitre numérique
Jazyk:Anglais
Vydáno: Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 2026
Témata:
autonomy
transcendental freedom
determinism
On-line přístup:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_812 https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.812 urn:doi:10.4000/ref.812 en https://journals.openedition.org/ref/812 2026-06-09T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/jqex All rights reserved Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2258-014X URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref Wells, Aaron autonomy transcendental freedom determinism Fichte's mature conception of transcendental freedom is the subject of some controversy. This paper hopes to shed light on Fichte's later conception by examining his earliest thoughts on the matter. The focus is on three pivotal years of Fichte's development between 1791 and 1793: A. 1791: Fichte’s Earliest Account of Freedom; B. 1792: Two Reviews and Fichte’s Doubts; C. 1793: Fichte’s Revised Account of Freedom. The paper begins with a discussion of Fichte's reflections on how a broadly Kantian conception of transcendental freedom can be manifest in the empirical world. Then the paper examines several short works from 1792 in which Fichte's views become significantly more sophisticated. It will be shown that Fichte confronts in these works the worry that neither a metaphysical account of the natural world, nor a mere appeal to ‘facts of consciousness,’ can be sufficient to establish autonomy in the positive sense. It will be argued that Fichte responds to these worries in two ways. One, relatively well known, is his attempt to prove the existence of practical reason from features of self-consciousness. The paper will focus instead on Fichte's account of moral motivation added to the 1793 second edition of the Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation. There, Fichte sketches an account of pure practical motivation that does not depend on direct appeal to features of self-consciousness, but is more in line with Kant's own appeal to the moral law.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic autonomy
transcendental freedom
determinism
spellingShingle autonomy
transcendental freedom
determinism
Wells, Aaron
Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte
description Fichte's mature conception of transcendental freedom is the subject of some controversy. This paper hopes to shed light on Fichte's later conception by examining his earliest thoughts on the matter. The focus is on three pivotal years of Fichte's development between 1791 and 1793: A. 1791: Fichte’s Earliest Account of Freedom; B. 1792: Two Reviews and Fichte’s Doubts; C. 1793: Fichte’s Revised Account of Freedom. The paper begins with a discussion of Fichte's reflections on how a broadly Kantian conception of transcendental freedom can be manifest in the empirical world. Then the paper examines several short works from 1792 in which Fichte's views become significantly more sophisticated. It will be shown that Fichte confronts in these works the worry that neither a metaphysical account of the natural world, nor a mere appeal to ‘facts of consciousness,’ can be sufficient to establish autonomy in the positive sense. It will be argued that Fichte responds to these worries in two ways. One, relatively well known, is his attempt to prove the existence of practical reason from features of self-consciousness. The paper will focus instead on Fichte's account of moral motivation added to the 1793 second edition of the Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation. There, Fichte sketches an account of pure practical motivation that does not depend on direct appeal to features of self-consciousness, but is more in line with Kant's own appeal to the moral law.
author Wells, Aaron
author_facet Wells, Aaron
author_sort Wells, Aaron
title Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte
title_short Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte
title_full Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte
title_fullStr Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte
title_full_unstemmed Freedom and Matter: From Kant to Fichte
title_sort freedom and matter: from kant to fichte
publisher Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.812
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ref/812
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